

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BOGOTA 06520 240021Z

64

ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-11

NSAE-00 RSC-01 SSO-00 INRE-00 SP-02 L-02 EB-03 PRS-01

IO-03 DRC-01 /056 W

----- 096892

O 232351Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3939

INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 6520

LIMDIS

E O 11652 GDS

TAGS PFOR CU CO OAS

SUBJ: FORNMIN VAZQUEZ' VIEW ON CUBAN QUESTION

1. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH FORNMIN VAZQUEZ THIS AFTERNOON HE MADE THE FOL POINTS:

A) THE PASTRANA GOVT WOULD NOT ACT UNILATERALLY TO RENEW RELATIONS WITH CUBA IN THE REMAINING DAYS OF ITS TENURE.

B) HE DISTINGUISHED THE AGREEMENT ON HIJACKING SIGNED YESTERDAY (BOGOTA 6497) FROM THE GENERAL POLICY QUESTION OF RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND SAID IT WAS NO MORE THAN THE US, VENEZUELA AND MEXICO HAD ALREADY DONE. HE DID ADD THAT IT WOULD STIMULATE LOCAL SENTIMENT FOR NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH CUBA.

C) HE HAD TELEPHONED LOPEZ TO TELL HIM ABOUT THE HIJACKING AGREEMENT AND LOPEZ "ENTHUSIASTICALLY" ENDORSED THE INITIATIVE, SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZING VAZQUEZ TO STATE PUBLICLY THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD LOPEZ' APPROVAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BOGOTA 06520 240021Z

D) HE HAD, HOWEVER, NEVER HAD A CHANCE TO TALK TO LOPEZ ABOUT

THE DEEPER ISSUE AND HE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT LOPEZ THOUGHT OR WHAT PLANS HE MIGHT HAVE. HE BELIEVED LOPEZ UNDOUBTEDLY FAVORED AN END TO CUBA'S ISOLATION AND LOPEZ WAS QUITE CAPABLE OF SIMPLY ANNOUNCING, A LA PERON, DURING HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS THAT HE INTENDED TO RENEW RELATIONS.

E) VAZQUEZ THOUGHT OAS ACTION WAS FAR PREFERABLE TO UNILATERAL ACTIONS, BUT HE THOUGHT THE LATTER WERE INEVITABLE IF SOME OAS ACTION IS NOT TAKEN VERY SOON. THE RIO TREATY AND THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY WERE BEING WEAKENED, BUT THIS WAS INEVITABLE UNLESS THE OAS BROUGHT THE JURIDICAL SITUATION INTO CONSONANCE WITH REALITY.

F) VAZQUEZ NOTED COSTA RICA'S FORMULA, AND SAID HE SYMPATHIZED WITH THE PURPOSE BUT HE THOUGHT IT TOO COMPLICATED. HE PARTICULARLY DISAGREED WITH A COMMISSION TO STUDY WHETHER CUBA WAS STILL A THREAT TO THE PEACE. THIS, HE SAID, WAS A DELAYING TACTIC. NO SUCH DISCUSSION COULD BE FRUITFUL, IT COULD GO ON FOREVER; ALMOST ANYBODY CAN BE CLAIMED TO BE A THREAT TO THE PEACE.

G) HE SAID HE FAVORED AN OAS DECISION TO SIMPLY LET EACH NATION DECIDE FOR ITSELF WHETHER IT WANTS RELATIONS WITH CUBA. BUT UNDER MY QUESTIONING HE CONCEDED THAT THE OAS COULD NOT BE STRENGTHENED IF IT FAILED COLLECTIVELY TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE BASIC QUESTION THAT LED TO THE SANCTIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE VIZ., IS CUBA A DANGER TO THE PEACE; DOES IT INTERVENE?

H) ON THIS POINT, HOWEVER, HE MAINTAINED THAT THE WAY THE OAS APPROACHED THE QUESTION COULD NOT BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DELAYING A DECISION, NOR COULD IT INVOLVE IDEOLOGY. IDEOLOGY SHOULD BE SEPARATED FROM THE FACTS OF WHETHER OR NOT CUBA SUBVERTS. HE SAID THAT PERHAPS WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IS TO ADOPT FACIO'S INITIATIVE BUT HAVE THE MEETING CONSIDER ONLY WHETHER THE SPECIFIC FACTS, I.E. INTERVENTION IN VENEZUELA, THAT LED TO THE 1964 SANCTIONS, STILL EXISTED. AGAIN I PRESSED HIM ON THE POINT THAT THE VENEZUELAN INTERVENTION WAS, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 1964 ACTION, EXEMPLARY OF A BROADER CONCLUSION, VIZ., THAT CUBA WAS SUBVERTING OTHER COUNTRIES. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CUBA WAS DOING THIS ANYWHERE WAS RELEVANT NOT JUST WHETHER IT HAD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BOGOTA 06520 240021Z

STOPPED IN VENEZUELA. VAZQUEZ THEN STATED THAT NEVERTHELESS TO AVOID A FRUITLESS, AND ENDLESS DEBATE IN WHICH EVERYONE FROM CUBAN EXILES TO CHILEAN RIGHTISTS COULD CLAIM WHAT THEY WANTED, THE OAS HAD TO FIND A WAY TO DECIDE QUICKLY ON CURRENT FACTS, PRESENT REALITIES AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AND INTERPRETATIONS IN THE WORLD.

I) VAZQUEZ AFFIRMED THAT TIMES HAD CHANGED, THAT THE SANCTIONS

AND ISOLATION MADE NO SENSE IN TODAY'S WORLD (AND HE CITED THE ARGENTINE CAR SITUATION AGAIN), AND THAT A WAY HAD TO BE FOUND TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH CUBA.

J) VAZQUEZ SAID THAT AS LONG AS THE US DOES NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE BUT MERELY STANDS PAT NOTHING CAN HAPPEN IN THE OAS, AND NATIONS WILL GO OFF ON THEIR OWN WITH UNILATERAL ACTION, ONE BY ONE.

2. I TOLD

THE MINISTER THAT I PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO CARACAS AT THE END OF THE WEEK AND WOULD HAVE A CHANCE TO CONSULT WITH AMB MAILLIARD WHO WOULD BE THERE. I THUS WOULD HAVE MORE INFORMATION LATER ON AS TO THE USG'S CURRENT VIEWS ON THIS GENERAL QUESTION. I WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE A CHANCE TO TALK TO HIM AGAIN ON MONDAY AFTER I RETURNED TO EXPLORE THE QUESTION FURTHER. HE SAID HE WOULD BE EAGER TO DO SO; HE NOTED THAT LOPEZ IS DUE BACK IN COLOMBIA THIS WEEK-END AND HE WOULD BE ABLE TO TALK TO HIM AND EXPLORE HIS VIEWS AND PLANS.

3. COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT VAZQUEZ BELIEVES THAT CUBAN ISOLATION MUST BE ENDED AND THAT THE PROBLEM IS TO FIND A WAY FOR THE OAS TO DO IT NOT TO DELAY IT. IF IT DOES NOT ACT HE BELIEVES THE SITUATION WILL SIMPLY CONTINUE TO CRUMBLE. I AM SURE THAT LOPEZ WOULD FEEL EVEN STRONGER ON THE SUBJECT. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS IS THAT LOPEZ MAY ALREADY HAVE MADE UP HIS MIND AND LAID HIS PLANS; IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE WOULD LISTEN TO A MULTILATERAL FORMULA, BUT NOT, I WOULD GUESS, JUST TO DELAY ACTION. IF HE HAS MADE UP HIS MIND TO MOVE UNILATERALLY, HE WILL BE HARD TO DISSUADE. IN ANY CASE, LOPEZ' THINKING AND PLANS ARE FOR THE MOMENT THE UNKNOWN IN THE COLOMBIAN SITUATION.
VAKY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, EMBARGOES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 JUL 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: kelleyw0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974BOGOTA06520
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740199-0770
From: BOGOTA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740727/aaaaawko.tel
Line Count: 146
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: kelleyw0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 11 SEP 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <11 SEP 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <19 FEB 2003 by kelleyw0>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FORNMIN VAZQUEZ' VIEW ON CUBAN QUESTION
TAGS: PFOR, CU, CO, XM, OAS, (VASQUEZ CARRIZOSA, ALFREDO)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005